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Abstract
We study e↵ort and risk-taking behaviour in an economy with a continuum of
principal-agent pairs where each agent exerts costly hidden e↵ort. Principals write con-
tracts based on both absolute and relative performance evaluations (APE and RPE)
to make individually optimal risk-return trade-o↵s but do not take into account their
impact on endogenously determined aggregate variables. This results in contractual
externalities when these aggregate variables are used as benchmarks in contracts. Con-
tractual externalities have welfare changing e↵ects when principals put too much weight
on APE or RPE due to information frictions. Relative to the second best, if the ex-
pected productivity is high, risk-averse principals over-incentivise their own agents,
triggering a rat race in e↵ort exertion, resulting in over-investment in e↵ort and exces-
sive exposure to industry risks. The opposite occurs when the expected productivity
is low, inducing pro-cyclical investment and risk-taking behaviours.
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1 Introduction
It is important to understand the sources of industry boom and bust cycles, especially in
light of the recent episodes in the high-tech and the finance industries. In these situations,
the excited anticipation of the arrival of a high productivity era associated with new techno-
logical breakthroughs leads to over-investment and excessive risk-taking in the corresponding
industry. This “overheating” in economic activities often gives way to a subsequent crash
where real investments and risks are substantially reduced. These pro-cyclical investment
and risk-taking behaviours have significant social and economic consequences (eg, the recent
great recession).
In this paper, we study a new mechanism based on frictions in contracting to explain
pro-cyclical and potentially suboptimal risk-taking in the economy. Our model contributes
to the contract theory literature by endogenising systemic risk creation within a multiple
principal-agent framework. More broadly, it provides an equilibrium framework of decen-
tralised contract choices of individual firms, setting an incentive-based foundation for study-
ing aggregate implications of firm-level behaviour.
In the model, there are many firms in an industry. Each firm has a principal who owns
a project and an agent who exerts costly hidden e↵ort.1 The return to e↵ort of all agents is
a↵ected by an industry productivity shock. As a result, the level of industry risk faced by a
firm is endogenous and is increasing in its agent’s e↵ort choice.2 Additionally, the project’s
payo↵ is subject to idiosyncratic risk. Principals choose contracts to make risk-return trade-
o↵s that are individually optimal. However, they do not take into account their impact
on aggregate variables such as average e↵ort in the industry. This results in contractual
externalities when these aggregate variables enter the contracting problems as benchmarks.
By investigating the conditions under which contractual externalities have welfare changing
e↵ects, our paper o↵ers a new perspective on excessive risk-taking phenomenon over the
boom-bust cycle.
1This contrasts with setups with one principal and many agents (eg, team incentives) or many principals
and one agent (eg, common agency).
2In this paper we treat the correlated industry risk and the systemic/common risk as the same and use
these terms interchangeably.
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In our baseline model, each principal uses a contract based on both absolute and relative
performance evaluations (hereinafter APE and RPE). By using industry average as the
benchmark in RPE, principals are able to shield their agents from correlated industry risk
but not from idiosyncratic risk. Hence, if they have to rely exclusively on RPE, principals
encourage their agents to take on industry risk which they have to shoulder entirely. When
feasible, principals would combine APE with RPE to improve risk sharing but the optimal
weight on APE might be positive or negative. When principals care mostly about industry
risk, they put positive weight on APE to expose their agents to industry risk and control
‘excessive’ industry risk taking. When principals care mostly about idiosyncratic risk, they
put negative weight on APE to reduce agents’ idiosyncratic risk exposure.3
In this setting, we study how individually optimal contracting a↵ects aggregate invest-
ment and risk-taking behaviour and its welfare implications using the baseline model as a
building block. A key feature of our model is that the industry benchmark is endogenously
determined because it is a function of the average managerial e↵ort, an equilibrium out-
come. Agents have incentives to match the industry benchmark to reduce their exposure to
the industry productivity shock, which generates a feedback loop between individual and the
industry average e↵ort among agents. This feedback loop creates an externality in setting
incentives among principals in the industry since principals take the industry benchmark as
given and do not take into account the impact of their choices on it. To study the welfare
impact of this externality we compare it with the second best where a planner maximises
the sum of the payo↵s of all the principals in the industry. When a principal gives stronger
incentives to her agent, this leads to an increase in the industry average e↵ort which has
two e↵ects. First, through the feedback loop, e↵orts of other agents, and hence expected
outputs of all other firms increase. Second, higher e↵orts by other agents generate additional
industry risks which are shouldered by all other principals. Since individual principals do not
internalise these e↵ects, relative to the second best, the first e↵ect leads to too little while
3Negative weight on APE can be surprising since it reduces incentive for e↵ort provision. However, this
can be optimal when it is very costly to let the agents take on additional idiosyncratic risk (eg., when agents
are quite risk averse relative to principals or idiosyncratic shocks are very volatile). Moreover, negative
weight on APE does not mean that agents are punished for good performance. When APE and RPE are
combined, agents are always rewarded for their own performance.
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the second leads to too much e↵ort provision. Despite this, in the baseline setup, where
principals can use both APE and RPE to separate their agents’ exposure to industry and
idiosyncratic risks, contractual externalities do not have welfare impact, ie, the equilibrium
outcome and the planner’s solution coincide.
In reality, there are often frictions that restrict the principals’ ability to separate the
industry and idiosyncratic risks using APE and RPE. In these situations, contractual exter-
nalities have welfare changing implications because principals put too much weight on one
contracting instrument relative to the other, triggering the feedback loop mentioned ear-
lier. One situation where information frictions arise naturally about industry and firm level
productivities is the arrival of a new technological innovation. In practice absolute perfor-
mances of CEOs are often measured by their firms’ individual stock prices and the industry
benchmark corresponds to the industry stock index. The hype around the new technology
often causes a run up in all stock prices in the industry, without revealing the underlying
industry productivity, eg, the dot.com boom in 1990s. The hype washes out when comparing
individual firms’ stock prices with the industry stock index. Hence, this type of information
friction does not a↵ect RPE but makes APE a noisy contractual instrument. As a result,
principals rely more heavily on RPE but less on APE, creating welfare changing e↵ects of
contractual externalities.
In the presence of such informational frictions, if the expected industry productivity is
high, eg, during a boom, a principal, in order to reap the high productivity benefit, would
like to elicit high e↵ort from her agent by increasing incentives. Since APE is noisy, she relies
more on RPE relative to the second best, which triggers a rat race among agents to exert
e↵ort and causes excessive industry risk exposure for principals. By contrast, if the expected
industry productivity is low, eg, during a recession, the principal would like to reduce her
agent’s e↵ort. Once again since APE is noisy, she reduces RPE instead. Relative to the
second best, this triggers a race to the bottom to exert e↵ort and generates too little industry
risk. In this case, the planner can improve the total welfare by making RPE countercyclical:
enforcing lower (higher) RPE during booms (busts). The model, therefore, o↵ers some
empirical predictions and policy guidance on managerial pay. For example, it predicts that
excessive investment and risk-taking is more likely in an industry where principals are risk-
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averse; the industry-wide productivity is expected to be high and volatile; and APE is
noisy. This is more likely to be true in emerging industries or industries experiencing large
technological shocks as opposed to mature ones where there is less uncertainty about the
industry productivity. Hence, it is relatively more important to have close supervision of
excessive risk-taking in industries with large positive technological shocks.
The mechanism described above leads to ine ciency in systemic but not in idiosyncratic
risk taking. To show this, in Section 7.1, we let productivity shocks to be correlated rather
than common across projects. As productivity shocks become less correlated, agents become
less motivated to match the industry average e↵ort since they cannot remove the exposure
to the idiosyncratic component of the productivity shocks from their compensation by doing
so. When the productivity shocks are completely idiosyncratic, there is no feedback loop
between individual and industry average e↵ort. This unique prediction on ine cient pro-
cyclical systemic (as opposed to idiosyncratic) risk taking is well supported by the data.4
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 2, we discuss the related literature.
In section 3, we present the model. In section 4, we lay out agents’, principals’ and planner’s
optimisation problems. In section 5, we study the baseline case without any information
frictions. We solve for the optimal linear contract under the equilibrium and the second
best and compare the two. In sections 6, we study the case with information frictions and
analyse the welfare impact of contractual externalities. In section 7, we extend the model to
incorporate heterogeneity in the correlation of productivity shocks among firms, the degree
of information frictions and firm sizes. Section 8 concludes.
4Hoberg and Phillips (2010) find that in the period of excessive risk taking, the common industry (rather
than idiosyncratic) productivity shocks are volatile and di cult to predict, indicating the existence of infor-
mation frictions, in their studies of industry boom-bus cycles. Bhattacharyya and Purnananda (2011) have
documented between 2000 and 2006, the period of financial industry boom and excessive financial risk taking,
idiosyncratic risks have dropped by almost half while systemic risks have doubled among US commercial
banks.
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2 Related Literature
Since the results in our paper hinge on the fact that contracts put some weight on
the industry average, our paper is closely related to the literature on relative performance
(starting with Holmstro¨m (1979); (1982)).5 We contribute to this literature theoretically in
several aspects. First we endogenise the relative benchmark by linking it with equilibrium
outcomes. Second, we study contractual externalities among multiple principal-agent pairs
and their welfare consequences. Our theoretical extension has many unique predictions on
the use of APE and RPE in compensation contracts that match well with the data and our
comparative statics produce many new testable implications.
Moreover, the theoretical results from our baseline model o↵er a potential resolution for
conflicting findings in the empirical literature on RPE. Earlier empirical work has found
that executives’ compensations are very sensitive to industry performance.6 These findings
are interpreted as indirect evidence that little RPE is observed in practice, hence challenge
the existing theory (Holmstro¨m 1979; 1982) which views the industry shocks as exogenous
and unrelated to e↵ort choices, and predicts that RPE will be used to make executives’
compensations insensitive to such shocks. However, this interpretation conflicts with more
recent empirical studies using a new source of data. Based on detailed disclosure data on
executive compensation contracts, these studies find that a significant proportion of firms
use some form of RPE.7 Our results from the baseline model shed light on these seemingly
5There are several other strands of contracting literature that analyse interactions among multiple princi-
pals and agents. For example, the literature on rivalrous agency (Myerson (1982), Vickers (1985), Freshtman
and Judd (1986; 1987), Sklivas (1987), Katz (1991), among others)) has examined the case in which princi-
pals hire agents to compete on their behalf in an oligopolistic setup. Our paper di↵ers in two aspects. First,
in our model principals do not engage in direct competition and the interactions among agents arises endoge-
nously via contracts that are based on correlated information. Second, our focus is di↵erent. We explore
implications of contractual externalities for aggregate ine ciencies. Our model also di↵ers from the litera-
ture on ‘common agency’ (Pauly (1974); Bernheim and Whinston (1986)) where multiple principals share a
single agent. Lastly, our model is related to but di↵erent from models of (rank order) tournaments (Akerlof
(1976); Lazear and Rosen (1981); Green and Stokey (1983); Nalebu↵ and Stiglitz (1983); and Bhattacharya
and Mookherjee (1986)) with one principal and many agents.
6See Gibbons and Murphy (1990); Prendergast (1999); Aggarwal and Samwick (1999).
7See De Angelis and Grinstein (2010) and Gong et al. (2010).
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conflicting findings since in our theory the sensitivity to industry risk can be desirable which
can be achieved by using a combination of RPE and APE. Furthermore, our model makes
new testable predictions on how structural economic variables a↵ect the optimal mix of RPE
and APE.
Our baseline model also sheds light on the related empirical observation that sensitivity of
CEO compensation to industry shocks is asymmetric. CEOs are rewarded for good industry
shocks but not punished for bad ones.8 Literature has so far highlighted rent-seeking by
CEOs as an explanation for these findings. We provide an alternative explanation based on
optimal contracting. In our model, when the expected industry productivity is high, agents
put more e↵ort resulting in more industry risks. Principals respond by putting positive
weight on APE to control industry risk taking, seemingly rewarding the agent for industry
performance. By contrast, when the expected industry productivity is low, idiosyncratic risks
become relatively more important. This results in lower weight on APE and makes agents’
compensations less sensitive to industry risks during downturns. In fact, our baseline model
makes the additional testable prediction that observed pro-cyclical pay sensitivity would
be more pronounced in industries where industry shocks are large and principals are more
risk-averse.
Our paper is also related to models that study excessive risk taking by allowing agents to
choose e↵ort and level of risk separately (See Diamond (1998); Biais and Casamatta (1999);
Palomino and Prat (2003); and Makarov and Plantin (2010)). In our model an agent’s e↵ort
choice and the riskiness of his project are tightly linked. This is because the productivity
of e↵ort is random and correlated across firms, and thus when an agent increases his e↵ort,
both the expected return and the systematic risk exposure of the project are higher. We
view this feature of the model desirable when studying excessive risk taking from a social
perspective, especially considering that episodes of over (under) investment at the industry
and/or the economy level are often observed together with excessive (insu cient) risk tak-
ing. We acknowledge that in some cases agents can choose risk and return of the projects
8See Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) and Garvey and Milbourn (2006).
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separately, however in others agents have to choose a portfolio of risk and return together.9
By treating the risk-return as a portfolio, our framework complements the understanding of
sub-optimal risk-taking in the principal-agent framework. Importantly, we di↵er from this
literature because agents in our framework take suboptimal amounts of industry rather than
idiosyncratic risks which arises from contractual externalities as opposed to nonlinearities in
payo↵ schedules.
The recent crisis has ignited an interest in macro and banking literature on excessive
risk taking behaviour of banks. To our knowledge, only one other line of literature predicts
excessive undertaking of systemic risks and the prediction is one-sided about booms. This
literature studies the incentive for banks to take on excessive risk collectively anticipating
bailouts in case of financial crisis (Acharya and Yorulmazer (2007); Acharya and Yorulmazer
(2008); Farhi and Tirole (2012); and Acharya et al. (2011)).
There is a line of financial literature that shows career or reputational concerns can lead
to herd like behavior among agents (eg., Scharfstein and Stein (1990); Rajan (1994); Zwiebel
(1995); and Guerrieri and Kondor (2012)). For example, Rajan (1994) models the informa-
tion externality across two banks where reputational concerns and short-termism induce
banks to continue to lend to negative NPV projects. He derives a theory of expansionary (or
liberal) and contractionary (or tight) bank credit policies which influence, and are influenced
by other banks’ credit policies and conditions of borrowers. However, his model does not
examine whether banks correlate their lending to similar industries or not. Further, in his
model the short-term nature of managerial decisions drives career concern and hence expan-
sionary bank credit policies during the boom, whereas in our model it is the information
frictions on systemic productivity shocks. By and large, the major di↵erence between our
paper and this line of research is that we study explicit rather than implicit incentives. This
allows us to generate quite di↵erent and unique testable predictions and policy implications;
eg, regulations on executive compensation over the business cycles.
More broadly, by studying equilibrium consequences of decentralised contract choices of
individual firms for risk-taking, our paper is also connected with a growing literature on
9Put di↵erently, agents may have to trade o↵ investing e↵ort in high-risk-high-return projects versus
low-risk-low-return projects.
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firm-macro dynamics (Khan and Thomas (2003); Bloom et al. (2007); Khan and Thomas
(2008); House (2014); Bloom et al. (2014)). In this line of literature, the frictions considered
include adjustment cost, fixed cost, or irreversibility of investment. Our model o↵ers an
alternative friction based on incentive provision to study macro implications of firm level
behaviour.
3 Model
In this section, we describe our setup, information environment, and equilibrium defini-
tion.
3.1 The Setup
There is a continuum of principals in an industry. Each principal owns a firm which
in turn owns a project. There is also a continuum of agents who are able to obtain a fixed
reservation utility in a competitive labor market. The principal hires an agent to work on the
project and o↵ers the agent a contract. Each principal, agent and project triplet is indexed
by i 2 [0, 1]. The principal’s objective is to maximise her expected utility which is based on
the expected final value of the project. Principals are potentially risk averse, and principal
i’s utility over wealth is given by uP (wi) =   exp ( rPwi) where rP   0.10
There are three dates t = 0, 1, 2. At t = 0, principal i o↵ers agent i 2 [0, 1] a contract. We
assume that contracts are o↵ered simultaneously. Agent i observes his contract and decides
whether to accept or reject it. If he accepts the contract, he chooses hidden e↵ort denoted by
ei on project i. Agent i’s e↵ort is costly and the cost is specified as C (ei) = e2i /2. We assume
that agent i’s utility over wealth and e↵ort is given by u (wi, ei) =   exp ( r (wi   C (ei)))
where r   0. At t = 1, two payo↵-relevant public signals about project i are revealed.
One is about agent i’s performance and the other is about the average performance of all
10Note that we allow for risk-averse principals. In presence of contractual externalities risk-neutrality of
principals is not an innocuous assumption. In reality, there are a number of reasons why principals might
be risk-averse or act as if they are risk-averse. Banal-Estano˜l and Ottavinani (2006) have discussed these
in detail, which include concentrated ownership, limited hedging, managerial control, limited debt capacity
and liquidity constraints, and stochastic productions.
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projects in the industry. We assume that these signals are contractible and determine agent
i’s compensation. All agents are paid at time 1. At t = 2, the final values of all projects are
realised and principals receive their payo↵s. For simplicity we assume no discounting.
3.2 Production Technology
We assume that project i generates output Vi, which is a random function of agent i’s
unobservable e↵ort and two stochastic shocks,
Vi = V (ei, h˜, ✏˜i). (1)
The randomness arises from a common random variable h˜, and a project-specific random
variable ✏˜i. We interpret h˜ as a common productivity shock to all projects and ✏˜i as an
output shock specific to the individual project. In the rest of the paper, we refer to h˜ as
the industry productivity shock or the systemic shock as it cannot be diversified away. The
important assumption is that @2Vi/(@h@ei) 6= 0, ie, the state of nature that is common
across agents, a↵ects the productivity of e↵ort. This specification is meant to capture the
uncertainty about industry productivity after a technological innovation.
Our results are based on a linear specification where Vi = h˜ei + ✏˜i. In our model, the
random variable h˜ is normally distributed with mean h¯ > 0 and variance  2h (ie, precision
⌧h = 1/ 2h). The random variable ✏˜i is normally distributed with mean zero and variance  
2
✏
(ie, precision ⌧✏ = 1/ 2✏ ).
11
Note that in our specifications, the productivity shock enters multiplicatively with e↵ort.
When  h = 0, the specification for output in our model is standard. In the more general case
where  h > 0, higher average e↵ort generates a higher return, but since the productivity of
e↵ort is random it also leads to higher volatility. Here, we have in mind a broad interpretation
of e↵ort as choosing the scale of the project, eg, by devoting more resources (time, personnel,
etc.) to it.12
11To show that the common component of productivity shocks is a key driver for our results, in Section 7.1,
we analyse an alternative specification where the productivity shocks have both common and idiosyncratic
components.
12Similar multiplicative function forms of productivity shocks and firm input choices have also been used
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3.3 Information Structure
In our model principals receive contractible signals about the output of their individual
projects, and the average output of the industry. We assume that the industry average reveals
the industry productivity shock h˜ with noise. The idea is that after a major technological
innovation there is uncertainty about industry productivity and it is di cult to assess the
realisation of this uncertainty through public signals such as industry stock price indices,
which themselves are very noisy.
Specifically, the first contractible signal is a noisy signal of project i’s outcome, ie, agent
i’s performance, given by
si = h˜ei + ✏˜i + ⇣˜, (2)
where ⇣˜ is an industry-wide noise normally distributed with mean zero and variance  2⇣ (ie,
precision ⌧⇣ = 1/ 2⇣ ).
The second is a noisy signal of the industry average project outcome, ie, the average
performance of all agents, given by
sI = h˜e+ ⇣˜, (3)
where e =
R 1
0 eidi is the average e↵ort of all agents. Note that since the signals about the
projects’ outcomes are correlated, the industry average output is observed with noise ⇣˜.
Hence, the industry average reveals the industry productivity h˜ with noise.
In this paper, we restrict attention to linear compensation contracts which is common in
the theoretical literature on principal-agent models. We let qi be a signal about the agent’s
performance relative to his peers given by,
qi = si   sI = h˜ (ei   e) + ✏˜i. (4)
In a linear contracting environment any contract written on si and sI can be written in
terms of si and qi, and vice versa. To provide better intuition, in the rest of the paper, we
assume that the principals write contracts on the relative performance signals rather than
the industry average signal.
to study firm dynamics with microeconomic rigidities in the macro literature. For example, Bloom et al.
(2014) model the firm output as a triple multiplicative product of industry, idiosyncratic productivity shocks
as well as firm’s choices on capital and labor.
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3.4 Equilibrium Definition
We assume that agent i’s linear compensation contract has three components. The first
component is a fixed wage Wi and the other two components condition the agent’s payment
on the realisation of the two signals. Therefore, agent i’s total compensation is given by
liqi + misi +Wi where li and mi measure the relative performance evaluation (RPE) and
absolute performance evaluation (APE) components of the contract.
Now we are ready to specify agent i’s optimisation problem. We assume that agents’
reservation utility is u
 
W
 
. Agent i accepts contract (li,mi,Wi) if his expected utility from
accepting the contract exceeds his reservation utility
E [u (liqi +misi +Wi   C (ei (li,mi,Wi)))]   u
 
W
 
, (5)
where ei (li,mi,Wi) is the optimal e↵ort choice conditional on accepting the contract. That
is,
ei (li,mi,Wi) = argmax
ei 0
E [u (liqi +misi +Wi   C (ei))] . (6)
We define an equilibrium of the model as follows.
Definition 1 An equilibrium consists of contracts (l⇤i ,m
⇤
i ,W
⇤
i ), e↵ort choices e
⇤
i , where e
⇤
i =
ei (l⇤i ,m
⇤
i ,W
⇤
i ) for each i 2 [0, 1] and average e↵ort e =
R 1
0 e
⇤
i di such that given e, the contract
(l⇤i ,m
⇤
i ,W
⇤
i ) solves principal i’s problem, ie, it maximises E [uP (Vi   (liqi +misi +Wi))],
subject to E [u ((liqi +misi +Wi)  C (ei))]   u
 
W
 
, where ei = ei (li,mi,Wi) (given in
(6)).
To study the potential externality in the economy, we also define the second best of the
model. It is defined as the solution to the planner’s problem where the planner maximises
the sum of the utilities of all principals conditional on the incentive and individual rationality
constraints for the agents. Formally,
Definition 2 A second-best solution consists of a contract
 
lSB,mSB,W SB
 
and e↵ort choice
eSB where eSB = ei
 
lSB,mSB,W SB
 
and the contract solves the planner’s problem, ie, it
maximises
R 1
0 E [uP (Vi   (liqi +misi +Wi))] di, subject to E [u ((liqi +misi +Wi)  C (ei))]  
u
 
W
 
, where ei = ei (li,mi,Wi) (given in (6)) .
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Note that the planner’s role is limited to coordinating the contracts written by principals.
In particular, the planner must give agents incentives to accept the contract and exert the
desired level of e↵ort.13
We begin our analysis in section 4 by first solving the agents’, principals’ and planner’s
problems in the contractual environment discussed above. In section 5, we study a baseline
case where ⌧⇣ = 1 where there is no information friction regarding the uncertain industry
productivity shock, h˜. In section 6, we incorporate in the model an information friction by
letting 0  ⌧⇣ <1. In these cases, APE is not fully informative and principals rely more on
RPE as contracting instruments. We discuss how the equilibrium e↵ort level compares with
the second-best and present results on comparative statics.
4 Agents’, Principals’ and Planner’s Problem
In this section we first solve agents’ equilibrium e↵ort choices for a given contract. We
then use this solution to characterise principals’ and the planner’s choices of optimal contract.
4.1 Agents’ E↵ort Choice
Given contract (li,mi,Wi) agent i’s compensation is:
liqi +misi +Wi = li
⇣
h˜ (ei   e) + ✏˜i
⌘
+mi
⇣
h˜ei + ✏˜i + ⇣˜
⌘
+Wi. (7)
Substituting (7) into agent i’s maximisation problem in (6) and computing the expectation,
agent i’s problem can be stated as choosing ei to maximize:
(li +mi) h¯ei lih¯e+Wi C (ei)  1
2
r
✓
(li (ei   e¯) +miei)2 1
⌧h
+ (li +mi)
2 1
⌧✏
+m2i
1
⌧⇣
◆
. (8)
From (8) we see how a given incentive package shapes agent i’s exposure to various sources
of risks. His risk exposure to the common productivity shock (h˜) depends on (i) the power of
the relative performance-based pay li times the di↵erence between his e↵ort and the average
13The second best contract pushes agents exactly to their reservation utilities. However, it would be
misleading to think that the second-best contract favours the principals’ since given CARA utilities and
linear contracts, the solution also maximises the total surplus.
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e↵ort (ei   e¯), and (ii) the power of absolute performance pay mi times his e↵ort ei. His
risk exposure to the common noise ⇣˜ depends solely on the power of absolute performance-
based pay while his risk exposure to the idiosyncratic noise ✏˜i depends on the power of total
performance-based pay. From this we can see that by matching the average e↵ort in the
industry, agent i is able to completely hedge his exposure to the industry risk that comes
through his relative performance pay, although he might still be exposed to some industry
risk that comes through his absolute performance pay. Taking the first-order condition and
solving for ei, we obtain agent i’s e↵ort choice as
ei =
(li +mi) h¯+
r
⌧h
li (li +mi) e¯
1 + r⌧h (li +mi)
2 . (9)
Note that agent i’s e↵ort is increasing in e¯, the average e↵ort exerted by all the other agents
with a positive relative performance pay sensitivity. Thus, when the average e↵ort increases,
agent i’s best response is to increase his e↵ort.
The term r/⌧h appears both in the denominator and the numerator of (9). In the de-
nominator, this term captures the fact that higher e↵ort results in higher industry risk and
consequently agent’s e↵ort declines in this risk aversion and the volatility of the industry
shock. More interestingly, the term r/⌧h is also in the numerator of (9), capturing the fact
that when r is higher or ⌧h is lower, the agent has a stronger incentive to match the average
e↵ort to hedge the industry risk. Through this second e↵ect, for a given contract (li,mi), the
agent’s e↵ort may increase with his risk aversion or the volatility of the industry productivity
shock.
Similarly, the total performance-based pay, (li +mi), also has opposing e↵ects on agent
i’s e↵ort choice. Increasing it makes agent i increase his e↵ort because his pay becomes more
sensitive to average productivity, h¯, and the magnitude of his performance relative to the
industry average e¯. This is captured by the (li +mi) term in the numerator of (9). At the
same time, increasing (li+mi) causes agent i to bear more industry risk by making the agent
deviate more from the industry average. This increase in risk exposure induces him to lower
his e↵ort. This is captured by the (li +mi) term in the the denominator in (9). In addition,
both e↵ects become stronger as the industry risk 1/⌧h increases. As we show later, these two
e↵ects underly the externalities that principals have to face in designing the compensation
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contracts.14
4.2 Principals’ Choice of Optimal Contract
Now we turn to the principals’ problem. Principal i chooses the contract terms (li,mi,Wi)
to maximise her expected utility, E [uP (Vi   (liqi +misi +Wi)))] subject to agent i’s indi-
vidual rationality constraint given by (5) and optimal e↵ort choice ei given by (9).
We proceed to solve the equilibrium contract terms (li,mi,Wi). Using (7) we obtain
principal i’s final payo↵ as
Vi   (liqi +misi +Wi) = h˜ei + ✏˜i   li
⇣
h˜ (ei   e) + ✏˜i
⌘
 mi
⇣
h˜ei + ✏˜i + ⇣˜
⌘
 Wi. (10)
Plugging (10) into principal i’s utility function, taking expectation and using agent i’s
individual rationality constraint to substitute for Wi, we see that principal i chooses (li,mi)
to maximise
h¯ei   C (ei)  1
2
rP
✓
(ei   li (ei   e) miei)2 1
⌧h
+ (1  li  mi)2 1
⌧✏
+m2i
1
⌧⇣
◆
 1
2
r
✓
(li (ei   e¯) +miei)2 1
⌧h
+ (li +mi)
2 1
⌧✏
+m2i
1
⌧⇣
◆
 W. (11)
The above expression has an intuitive interpretation as it is principal i’s and agent i’s
combined surplus. The first term is the expected output of the project, the second term is
the cost of agent i’s e↵ort, and the next two terms are the disutilities from the risk exposures
of the agent and the principal respectively.
From the above expression, we see that APE and RPE play di↵erent roles in risk sharing
between principals and agents. APE introduces agents to both industry and idiosyncratic
risks. By contrast, when agents match each other’s e↵ort choices, RPE shields agents from
industry risk, although it still exposes agents to idiosyncratic risk.
In this paper we will restrict attention to situations where the equilibrium is unique.
Next proposition guarantees the existence of a unique equilibrium as long as the industry
risk is not too large.15
14Note that in the limit, as the industry risk approaches zero, our model delivers the standard result where
agent i’s e↵ort is determined by his performance pay and the productivity of his e↵ort, ie, (li +mi)h¯.
15When the industry risk is large, it is possible to construct examples of multiple equilibria. The multi-
plicity of equilibrium contracts is an interesting possibility that is worth studying further in future work.
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Proposition 1 Given h¯, r, rP , there exists ⌧¯h such that for all ⌧h > ⌧¯h there exists a unique
equilibrium contract which is symmetric.16
Note that once the values of h¯, r, rP are fixed, Proposition 1 guarantees that there is a
unique equilibrium for large enough ⌧h regardless of the values of ⌧✏ and ⌧⇣ .17
4.3 Planner’s Problem
From Definition 2 we see that the planner chooses the contract terms l andm to maximise
the sum of principals’ utilities subject to incentive and participation constraints. Since prin-
cipals’ optimisation problems are identical, the planner’s problem can be seen equivalently
as maximising the utility of one of the principals taking into account that e⇤i = e¯. That is,
the planner internalises the impact of the contract terms on the industry average e↵ort level
e¯. Thus, the planner chooses (l,m) to maximise
h¯e  C (e)  1
2
rP
✓
e2 (1 m)2 1
⌧h
+ (1  l  m)2 1
⌧✏
+m2
1
⌧⇣
◆
 1
2
r
✓
m2e2
1
⌧h
+ (l +m)2
1
⌧✏
+m2
1
⌧⇣
◆
 W, (12)
where
e =
(l +m) h¯
1 + r⌧h (l +m)m
. (13)
In our model, industry benchmark is a function of the industry average e↵ort. Since
agents have incentives to match the industry benchmark to reduce their exposure to the
industry productivity shock, this generates a feedback loop between individual and the in-
dustry average e↵ort of the agents. By comparing equations (11) and (12), we observe that
in the decentralised equilibrium principals do not internalise their choices of contract terms
on the industry average e↵ort while the planner does. As a result, this feedback loop cre-
ates externalities, which we term as contractual externalities, in the decentralised equilibrium
where the principals do not take into account their impact on the industry benchmark. Com-
paring the decentralised equilibrium outcome with the second best allows us to investigate
16All proofs are in Appendix A.
17This allows us to fix ⌧h and perform comparative statics with respect to ⌧✏ and ⌧⇣ (without losing
existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium).
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the magnitude and the direction of these contractual externalities and perform comparative
statics.
5 The Baseline Model
In this section, we study the baseline set up where ⌧⇣ ! 1 and the noise ⇣˜ disappears.
As we show below, in this case information friction regarding the uncertain industry shock h˜
is absent. We begin our analysis by explicitly characterising the equilibrium in this baseline
case.
Proposition 2 When ⌧⇣ approaches infinity, the optimal contract (l⇤,m⇤,W ⇤) is symmetric
and unique. The total performance sensitivity a⇤ = l⇤+m⇤ is the unique positive root to the
following equation:
h¯2
✓
r
⌧h
a+ 1
◆✓
r
⌧h
+
rP
⌧h
◆2
(a  1) (14)
+
 
r
⌧h
+
rP
⌧h
+
✓
r
⌧h
◆2
a2
✓
rP
⌧h
+ 1
◆
+ 2
rP
⌧h
r
⌧h
a
!2✓
a
r
⌧✏
+ (a  1) rP
⌧✏
◆
= 0.
Given a⇤ the contract term m⇤ is given by:
m⇤ = a⇤  
r
⌧h
⇣
1 + r⌧h (a
⇤)2
⌘
+ rP⌧h (a
⇤   1)
⇣
r
⌧h
a⇤ + 1
⌘
⇣
r
⌧h
a⇤ + 1
⌘⇣
r
⌧h
+ rP⌧h
⌘ . (15)
The equilibrium contract of the baseline model features both APE and RPE, although
the optimal weight on APE, m⇤, might be positive or negative. Corollary 1 characterises the
sign of APE in equilibrium.
Corollary 1 The weight on the absolute performance signal m⇤, is positive (negative, zero)
if
h¯2
rP
⌧h
✓
rP
⌧h
+ 1
◆
+
rP
⌧h
rP
⌧✏
✓
1 +
r
⌧h
◆
+
r
⌧✏
✓
rP
⌧h
  r
⌧h
◆
(16)
is positive (negative, zero).
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It is interesting to note that when m⇤ is strictly positive, agents are rewarded for better
industry performance. In contrast, in the single-agent relative performance model, under
corresponding assumptions, agents would not be rewarded by what seems to be luck rather
than e↵ort.18 The di↵erence in the results is due to the fact that in our model the level
of industry risk faced by the firm is endogenously determined and increasing in the agent’s
e↵ort.
We can see from the principal’s objective function in (11) that when the agents match
the average e↵ort in the industry, they do not face any industry risk through RPE. The
only industry risk they face comes from APE. In this sense, like in Holmstro¨m (1982), RPE
completely filters out the correlated risk or the luck component. At the same time, the fact
that RPE shields them from the industry risk means that the agents do not consider the
impact of their e↵ort choice on their firm’s exposure to the industry risk, potentially exposing
their principals to it excessively. Therefore, di↵erent from the classical relative performance
literature, our model finds that principals use APE to control and share risks with agents
which RPE alone cannot achieve.
Specifically, APE plays two roles from risk-sharing perspective. First, by exposing agents
to the industry risk, it reduces their incentive to take on industry risk. Second, it o↵sets
agents’ idiosyncratic risk exposure. The condition in Corollary 1 shows which of these
forces prevails in equilibrium. Suppose principals are risk averse and fix rP > 0. When
average return to e↵ort and/or industry risk is high, the optimal contracts puts a positive
weight on APE (ie., m > 0) so that agents would internalise their tendency to take on too
much industry risk. By contrast, when average return to e↵ort and/or industry risk is low,
the optimal contract puts a negative weight on APE (ie., m < 0) to reduce the agents’
idiosyncratic risk exposure.19
18In the standard relative performance model principal observes two signals: a noisy signal of the agent’s
performance and a second signal that is uninformative about the agent’s performance but correlated with
the noise term of the first signal. The second signal could be the performance of other agents working on the
project but could also be any other information correlated with the signal about the agent’s performance.
When the two signals are positively correlated, the second signal gets a negative weight. This is because
when the second signal is higher, the principal learns that the noise in the first signal is likely to be high.
Putting a negative weight on the second signal, allows the principal not to reward the agent for luck.
19The assumption of risk-neutrality of principals is not innocuous in the presence of contractual external-
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This finding regarding the purposes of APE versus RPE in compensation contracts o↵ers
a unique explanation to various empirical puzzles. For example, the empirical phenomenon
of “paying for luck” might be due to the fact that principals want to control agents’ excessive
risk-taking tendency. This empirical fact is established by running a regression of executive
pay on industry benchmarks. However, as we show, there might be a large amount of RPE in
the compensation contracts (high l) even when the pay is positively correlated with industry
risk (high m). This simple regression only reflects the net e↵ect of APE and RPE and is no
longer su cient. Our model shows that principals’ usage of APE and RPE is more complex
in the presence of both industry and idiosyncratic risks and a careful decomposition of the
pay package to undercover this underlaying cause of a particular mix of APE and RPE
instruments is needed instead. Furthermore, based on Corollary 1, our model predicts the
“pay for luck” phenomenon occurs more often in industries with volatile and high expected
productivity, while in industries where expected productivity is low, and firm-specific risks
are larger, our model finds that the sensitivity to industry risks is much lower, even turns
negative, predicting an asymmetry in “paying for luck.” These are new testable implications.
Next we turn to the comparison of the the decentralised equilibrium and the planner’s
solution in the baseline case.
Proposition 3 When ⌧⇣ approaches infinity, the e↵ort choices and contracts coincide in
equilibrium and in the planner’s solution.
In other words, if the industry productivity shock is perfectly revealed, principals are able
to completely counteract the impact of externalities among agents’ e↵ort-taking through
optimal contracting. To see this algebraically, let ⌧⇣ go to infinity, set ai = li + mi and
ci = lie¯. Substituting these in (11) we can restate principal i’s problem as choosing (ai, ci)
to maximize:
h¯ei   1
2
rP
✓
(ei   aiei + ci)2 1
⌧h
+ (1  ai)2 1
⌧✏
◆
  C (ei)  1
2
r
✓
(aiei   ci)2 1
⌧h
+ a2i
1
⌧✏
◆
 W
ities because it completely shuts down the first role played by APE. Risk neutral principals do not mind
shouldering all the industry risk, so they do not need to reduce their agents’ incentive to take on industry risk.
However, they are concerned about their agents’ idiosyncratic risk exposure since they have to compensate
them for it. Hence, risk neutral principals always put negative weight on APE.
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where agent i’s e↵ort is given by
ei =
aih¯+
r
⌧h
aici
1 + r⌧ha
2
i
Note that stated this way principals’ problems are completely separated and e¯ no longer
plays a role. This is because principal i can completely eliminate the impact of the industry
average e↵ort e¯ by adjusting ci. By redefining the principals’ optimisation problem this
way, we see that it coincides with the planner’s problem and Proposition 3 is obvious.
Intuitively, when information friction on industry risk is absent, principals can use the two
contractual instruments – APE and RPE – to fine tune their agents’ exposures to the two
types of risks – industry and idiosyncratic – and undo the welfare e↵ect of the contractual
externality regardless of the industry average e↵ort. The planner, therefore, has no role to
play in this environment. Here we observe a parallel between the workings of contractual and
pecuniary externalities. In general, pecuniary externality also does not have welfare changing
e↵ects except for conditions as established in Stiglitz (1982), Greenwald and Stiglitz (1986),
Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1985), Arnott, Greenwald and Stiglitz (1994), and more
recently Farhi and Werning (2013).20
In the following two sections, we extend the baseline model to 0  ⌧⇣ < 1. In these
cases principals receive noisy and correlated signals about absolute performances, and have to
rely more on relative performance information. We illustrate how the resulting information
friction restricts the principals’ ability to separate the two types of risks, shapes the contracts
and generates welfare changing e↵ects.
20There is an explosion of the literature on the welfare e↵ect of pecuniary externalities due to the growing
interests in studying social ine ciency of booms-busts. This includes but not limited to the following:
Krishnamurthy (2003); Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001; 2003); Gromb and Vayanos (2002); Korinek
(2010); Bianchi (2010); Bianchi and Mendoza, (2011); Stein (2012); Gersbach and Rochet (2012); He and
Kondor (2013); Farhi and Werning (2013). Davila (2011) and Stavrakeva (2013) have nice summaries of this
literature. Similar to pecuniary externalities, we show later that, with frictions, contractual externalities
might have welfare changing e↵ects.
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6 Information Friction
Often major technological innovations make it extremely di cult to assess the produc-
tivity of an industry but it is still possible to evaluate an agent’s performance relative to his
peers. To capture this feature in the simplest way, we begin our analysis by allowing the
industry-wide noise on APE to be extremely volatile, that is, by letting ⌧⇣ be zero.21
In this limiting case, principals do not have any information about h˜ directly, and both
signals si and sI are uninformative by themselves. However, their di↵erence qi is informative
because it is una↵ected by the common noise ⇣˜. Consequently, principals can only assess
how much better or worse their agents are performing relative to the average and have to
base agents’ compensation on this information alone. As a result, m⇤i = 0, that is, contracts
do not include an absolute performance-based pay component. In section 7.2, we relax this
assumption and study the intermediate case of 0 < ⌧⇣ <1.
To solve her problem, principal i takes e¯ as given and chooses the optimal linear contract
which we denote by l⇤i . The following proposition characterises the equilibrium contract and
e↵ort levels.
Proposition 4 When ⌧⇣ = 0, under the conditions in Proposition 1, a unique symmetric
equilibrium contract exists and satisfies
h¯2
r
⌧h
(l⇤)2 + 1
(1  l⇤)
✓
1  rP
⌧h
l⇤
◆
  1
⌧✏
(rl⇤   rP (1  l⇤)) = 0. (17)
Moreover, l⇤ 2 (0, 1) and the equilibrium e↵ort level is e⇤ = e¯ = l⇤h¯.
21Intuitively, when there is a great uncertainty about the industry productivity, it is relatively easy to
assess an agent’s performance relative to his peers. That is, the information on the ranking of agents is
more precise than the information on an agent’s absolute performance level. Empirically, we observe that
stock analysts are better at ranking stocks than pricing stocks (Da and Schaumburg (2011)). The finance
literature is more successful in explaining cross-sectional equity returns while the equity premium remains
a puzzle. Moreover, this information structure parsimoniously captures the tournament-like incentives that
agents face in the real world. For example, the ranking of businesses, university programs, fund managers,
doctors in di↵erent specialities, and even economists of di↵erent vintages, is prevalent when there is also
(possibly quite noisy) information on their individual performance.
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6.1 Equilibrium Properties
The expositional clarity of the equilibrium RPE (l⇤) in (17) allows us to explore further
properties of contracts in this economy. To illustrate, we dissect the equilibrium condition
(17) into terms that reflect the tradeo↵ between incentives and risk-sharing. To do so we
define the incentive provision as the level of compensation when the sole purpose of the
contract is to incentivise the agents to exert e↵ort, and the risk-sharing provision as the
level of compensation when the purpose of the contract is to allow risk sharing between
principals and agents. The following corollary of Proposition 4 characterises the optimal
contract in two limiting cases.
Corollary 2 When ⌧✏ goes to infinity, the optimal linear contract reflects only the incentive
provision and is given by l⇤i = min{1, ⌧h/rP}. When ⌧✏ goes to zero, the optimal linear
contract reflects only the risk-sharing provision and is given by l⇤i = rP/(rP + r).
Corollary 2 allows us to identify the terms in the equilibrium condition (17) that corre-
spond to incentive and risk sharing provisions:
h¯2
1
r
⌧h
(l⇤i )
2 + 1| {z }
Cost of Unilateral Deviations
in Incentive Provision
(1  l⇤i )
✓
1  rP
⌧h
l⇤i
◆
| {z }
Incentive Provision
  1
⌧✏
(rl⇤i   rP (1  l⇤i ))| {z }
Risk-Sharing Provision
= 0. (18)
The magnitude of risk-sharing provision is standard and depends on the relative risk-
aversions of principals and agents, rP/(rP + r). The magnitude of the incentive provision
has aspects unique to our model. In the standard moral hazard framework the magnitude
of incentive provision is simply 1. This is because when there is no risk sharing concern,
it is optimal to “sell the project” to the agent. A key insight of our model is that this
intuition does not hold when there is endogenous risk creation by the agents and this risk
is borne disproportionately by the principals. In fact, in our model, principals shoulder
all industry risk in equilibrium and the amount of industry risk depends on agents’ e↵ort
choices.22 Principals take into account the endogenous industry risk and their appetite for
22To see why this is this case, recall in equilibrium e⇤i = e¯. This implies that each agent’s industry risk
exposure in his compensation contract is zero in equilibrium (from (8)).
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it and set l⇤i = min{1, ⌧h/rP} when there is no risk sharing concern. Thus, the magnitude
of incentive provision is less than 1 when industry productivity is volatile or principals are
risk averse enough.
The weights that the incentive and the risk-sharing concerns receive in the equilibrium
contract are given by their coe cients in (18). The ratio of these two coe cients captures
the relative importance of the two concerns.
The decomposition in (18) shows that industry and idiosyncratic risks a↵ect the relative
importance of incentive provision through di↵erent channels. Because idiosyncratic risks are
shared, when 1/⌧✏ goes up, the importance of incentive provision relative to risk sharing
declines. The impact of industry risk is more subtle. It a↵ects the relative importance
of incentive provision through the term (r(l⇤i )
2/⌧h + 1).23 This term is a↵ected by agent
i’s risk aversion and captures his disutility from taking on additional industry risk when
incentivised to work (potentially) more than the industry average.24 Note that this cost is
not incurred by agents in equilibrium. Nevertheless it plays a role in the determination of
the equilibrium contract. This is because a principal, considering unilateral deviation from
equilibrium, would take this cost into account.
Next we highlight comparative statics that are unique to our model with potentially new
empirical implications.25 In the standard moral hazard framework, the power of contracts
increases in the marginal productivity of e↵ort h¯ and the precision of idiosyncratic risk ⌧✏.
As the next proposition shows, in our model, this is not necessarily the case.
Proposition 5 If ⌧h/rP < (>,=) rP/(rP + r), l⇤ decreases (increases, is constant) in h¯ and
⌧✏.
23This term appears in (9) when we solve agent i’s optimal e↵ort (except that here m = 0).
24Of course, in equilibrium, agent i’s industry risk exposure in his compensation contract is zero since agent
i hedges industry risk by choosing e⇤i = e¯. Since each principal takes other principals and agents behaviours
as given, in her view, deviating from equilibrium choice and providing stronger incentives unilaterally would
impose her agent to bear more risk and hence result in this additional cost of incentive provision.
25To test these implications, it is possible to obtain empirical proxies for the model parameters such
as industry (marginal) productivity, industry risks and idiosyncratic risks, as well as risk aversions of the
principals and agents. For example, one can use the proportion of institutional investors in the shareholder
base of a firm as a proxy for (the inverse of) risk aversion of the firm.
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To understand this proposition first note that the importance of incentive provision rel-
ative to risk sharing is increasing in h¯ and ⌧✏. In the standard moral hazard framework, the
magnitude of incentive provision is 1 and it always exceeds the magnitude of risk sharing
provision rP/(rP + r). Hence, when the relative importance of incentive provision increases,
the power of the contract also increases. In contrast, in our model, as we explained above
due to endogenous risk taking, it is possible to have the magnitude of incentive provision
smaller than that of risk sharing provision. In this case, when the relative importance of
incentive provision increases, the power of the contract decreases.
Comparative statics of the equilibrium contract l⇤ with respect to the principals’ and the
agents’ risk aversion parameters, rP and r, also provide new empirical implications. In the
standard moral hazard setting, as the principal becomes more or the agent becomes less risk
averse, l⇤ increases to provide better risk-sharing. The next proposition illustrates that in the
present setting there are opposing e↵ects which can dominate the direct e↵ect of improved
risk sharing.
Proposition 6 If h¯ or ⌧✏ are large enough, l⇤ decreases in rP . If, in addition, ⌧h/rP <
rP/(rP + r), l⇤ increases in r.
Both statements in Proposition 6 reflect the tradeo↵ between the two e↵ects in (18). The
first statement shows the comparative static with respect to the principal’s risk aversion rP .
When h¯ or ⌧✏ are large, the incentive provision e↵ect dominates the direct e↵ect from the
risk sharing. Since the principal needs to shoulder the entire industry risk, as she becomes
more risk averse, the magnitude of incentive provision goes down. As a result, l⇤ decreases
in rP .
The intuition for the second statement in Proposition 6 is more subtle since agents’
risk aversion r a↵ects both the magnitude of the risk-sharing provision and the relative
importance of risk-sharing versus incentive provision. Suppose the magnitude of risk sharing
provision is larger than that of incentive provision, i.e., ⌧h/rP < rP/(rP + r). As r increases,
there are two opposing forces. First, the magnitude of risk-sharing e↵ect decreases (even
though it is still larger than that of incentive provision), which is the direct e↵ect mentioned
earlier. Second, the importance of risk-sharing relative to incentive provision increases and
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hence the contract reflects more the relatively larger risk sharing e↵ect. This statement shows
that starting from a situation where the incentive e↵ect dominates, increasing r results in a
large shift towards risk-sharing, and hence the equilibrium power of the contract increases:
l⇤ increases in r.
6.2 Comparison with the Second Best
Next, for the case ⌧⇣ = 0, we compare the equilibrium e↵orts and contracts with their
second-best levels. Recall that second-best solves the problem of the planner who internalises
the impact of the contracts on the industry average e↵ort level e¯. As we discussed in Section
4.3, the planner’s problem can be viewed as maximising the objective function given in (12)
subject to agents’ e↵ort choices given in (13). Since, when ⌧⇣ = 0, the planner optimally sets
m = 0, from (13) we obtain e = lh¯. Plugging this into (12), the planner’s problem becomes
max
l 0

 1
2
h¯2l
✓
l
✓
1 +
✓
rP
⌧h
◆◆
  2
◆
  1
2
l2
r
⌧✏
  1
2
(1  l)2 rP
⌧✏
 
. (19)
The first-order condition of the problem is
h¯2
✓
1  lSB
✓
rP
⌧h
+ 1
◆◆
| {z }
Incentive Provision
  1
⌧✏
 
rlSB   rP
 
1  lSB  | {z }
Risk-Sharing Provision
= 0, (20)
and the solution to the planner’s problem is:
lSB =
rP
⌧✏
+ h¯2
r
⌧✏
+ rP⌧✏ + h¯
2
⇣
rP
⌧h
+ 1
⌘ . (21)
Like the optimal equilibrium contract, the second-best solution also reflects the incentive
and risk-sharing provisions. From (20) we obtain the following limiting results for the second-
best contract. When ⌧✏ goes to infinity, the second-best contract reflects only incentive
provision and is given by lSB = 1/(rP/⌧h + 1). When ⌧✏ goes to zero, the second-best
contract reflects only risk-sharing provision and is given by lSB = rP/(rP + r).
Although the second-best solution of (20) is similar to the equilibrium solution of (18)
in reflecting both incentive and risk-sharing provisions, there are two important di↵erences.
First, the second best requires a lower magnitude of incentive provision than in equilibrium.26
26Since 1/(rP /⌧h + 1) < min{1, ⌧h/rP }.
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Second, there is no cost of unilateral deviations in incentive provision. That is, contractual
externality has two opposing e↵ects. Intuitively, the first e↵ect arises because principals
do not take into account the industry risk exposure of other principals in the industry.
When principals are risk averse, they have to trade o↵ incentivising their agents to work
harder versus exposing themselves to more industry risks in their projects. Stronger the
incentive they choose, higher the output they would expect, and larger the industry risk
they are exposed. Their industry risk exposure is endogenously linked to the strength of the
incentives they provide. When setting incentives, a principal optimally chooses her own risk-
return tradeo↵ ignoring her impact on increasing other principals’ industry risk exposure. In
the second best, a planner sets incentives by taking into account the feedback loop between
industry average and individual e↵ort choices and consequences of industry risk exposure for
other principals in the industry. This means, the second best requires weaker incentives for
agents.
The second e↵ect goes in the opposite direction and arises because each principal perceives
a unilateral deviation from the industry average as being too costly. Recall, the cost of
unilateral deviations in incentive provision is incurred in equilibrium when a principal, who
takes the industry average e↵ort e¯ as given, considers increasing incentives and making her
agent work harder unilaterally. The principal realises that by doing so, her agent’s e↵ort
would be above e¯ which imposes costly industry risk on the agent, and she has to compensate
the agent for this risk. In the second best, this unilateral deviation cost disappears because
planner can coordinate (dictate) incentive provision across all principals in the industry.
Therefore, the relative importance of incentive provision is higher in second best.
To summarise, the externality in the model has two opposing e↵ects on the performance-
pay sensitivity in the contract. Compared with the second best, the magnitude of equilibrium
incentive provision is larger because principals do not internalise the impact of their incen-
tive provision on the average e↵ort level and the industry risk exposure of other principals,
consequently, provide too much incentive. However, the relative importance of equilibrium
incentive provision is lower because principals perceive unilateral increases in incentive provi-
sion as too costly. The next proposition characterises which e↵ect dominates and whether the
equilibrium contract is more or less sensitive to performance than the second-best contract.
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Proposition 7 The equilibrium contract is more sensitive to performance than the second-
best contract, ie, lSB < l⇤, and consequently agents put more e↵ort in equilibrium than the
second best, ie, eSB < e⇤, if
h¯2
rP
⌧h
✓
rP
⌧h
+ 1
◆
+
rP
⌧h
rP
⌧✏
✓
1 +
r
⌧h
◆
+
r
⌧✏
✓
rP
⌧h
  r
⌧h
◆
(22)
is positive. Similarly, lSB > l⇤ and eSB > e⇤, if (22) is negative; lSB = l⇤ and eSB = e⇤, if
(22) is zero.
Comparing Proposition 7 and Corollary 1, we note that (16) and (22) are identical.
Hence, we immediately obtain the following result linking the usage and the sign of APE in
the baseline model with the direction of ine ciencies that result from basing contracts on
RPE alone.
Proposition 8 When ⌧⇣ = 0 and contracts are based solely on RPE, the equilibrium contract
is more (less, equally) sensitive to performance than the second-best contract if and only if the
weight on the absolute performance signal, m⇤, is positive (negative, zero) when informational
friction is absent (ie, when ⌧⇣ =1).
Proposition 8 gives a di↵erent perspective regarding excessive/insu cient risk taking
with only RPE. Recall from the discussion in section 5 that APE can be positive or negative
in equilibrium depending on principals’ desire to control their agents’ excessive industry
risk taking versus idiosyncratic risk exposures. When principals are more concerned about
excessive industry risk taking, they use positive APE, ie, setm > 0, to incentivise their agents
while letting them internalise the industry risk they generate. Otherwise, they use negative
APE, ie, set m < 0 to reduce the agents’ idiosyncratic risk exposure. When principals would
like to use positive APE but are constrained from doing so, they increase RPE instead to
incentivise their agents, ie, set a larger l. This triggers a positive feedback loop between
the industry average and agents’ e↵ort choices, causing excessive e↵ort provision and risk
taking in equilibrium relative to the second best. Similarly, when principals would like to
use negative APE but are constrained from doing so, they lower RPE instead, triggering
a negative feedback loop, this time causing insu cient equilibrium e↵ort and risk-taking
relative to the second best.
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These results show a pro-cyclical pattern of incentive provision, e↵ort choice and risk-
taking in the economy. To see this, note that (22) is positive for a su ciently large h¯ if
principals are risk-averse. When h¯ is large, the incentive provision term gets a larger weight
in equilibrium than in the second-best (shown as the coe cient in front of the incentive
concern term in equations (18) and (20)). This means that when h¯ is large, ie, during the
productivity boom, the contracting between principals and agents is more motivated by the
incentive concern. During this time, the expected productivity of e↵ort is very high, and
principals would like to o↵er their own agents a contract with a high performance sensitivity.
By doing so, they do not internalise the impact of their own incentive provision on increasing
the industry average e↵ort, and trigger a rat race. Since marginal productivity of e↵ort is
random in our model, an immediate consequence of this result is that there is excess risk-
taking behaviour among agents in equilibrium. The planner, in this case, can improve the
total welfare by enforcing lower performance-based pay sensitivities in agents’ compensation
contracts.
By contrast, when h¯ is low, eg, during downturns, (22) is likely to be negative.27 In this
case, since the expected productivity of e↵ort is low, the incentive provision term gets a lower
weight in equilibrium than in the second-best. The cost of providing incentives unilaterally
becomes a major consideration for principals. Principals would like to free-ride on each other
in incentive provision, o↵ering their agents a contract with a low performance-pay sensitivity.
By doing so, principals again do not internalise the impact of their own incentive-provision
on increasing the industry average e↵ort, and hence under-incentivise the agents relative to
the second-best. This again triggers a race but this time causes a race to the bottom. There
is insu cient e↵ort- and risk-taking. In this case, the planner can improve the total welfare
by enforcing contracts with higher performance based pay-sensitivities.
27More precisely, if agents are su ciently risk averse and r > rP > 0, (22) is positive if h¯ is above a cuto↵
and negative if below it.
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7 Robustness and Extensions
7.1 Industry-wide vs. Idiosyncratic Variations in Productivity
In this section, we show that the excessive (insu cient) e↵ort provision is related to the
common/systemic rather than project-specific/idiosyncratic risk. To highlight the source
of externality we consider the case where the productivity shock is correlated across firms
in the industry. Specifically, we let Vi =
⇣
↵h˜+ (1  ↵) k˜i
⌘
ei + ✏˜i where ↵ 2 [0, 1] and k˜i
is a project-specific random term which is independently and normally distributed across
agents with mean k and variance 1/⌧k. In this formulation, when ↵ = 0 productivity shock
is idiosyncratic, as ↵ increases it becomes more correlated, and when ↵ = 1 it is common
across firms in the industry.
As before, we assume that the two contractible signals are
si =
⇣
↵h˜+ (1  ↵) k˜i
⌘
ei + ✏˜i + ⇣˜,
and
sI =
⇣
↵h˜+ (1  ↵) k
⌘
e¯+ ⇣˜,
where e¯ is the average e↵ort exerted by the agents in the industry. The relative performance
signal qi is,
qi = si   sI = ↵h˜ (ei   e) + (1  ↵)
⇣
k˜iei   ke¯
⌘
+ ✏˜i. (23)
We can now write agent i’s compensation when absolute performance signals are not
contractible (eg., ⌧⇣ = 0) as
liqi +Wi = li
⇣
↵h˜ (ei   e) + (1  ↵)
⇣
k˜iei   ke¯
⌘
+ ✏˜i
⌘
+Wi. (24)
Using (24), given a contract (li,Wi) and average e↵ort e¯, agent i chooses ei to maximise
E (u ((liqi +Wi)  C (ei))) .
Plugging in qi and computing the expectation in the above equation, the agent’s problem
can be restated as choosing ei to maximise
li
 
↵h¯+ (1  ↵) k  (ei   e)+Wi C (ei) 1
2
r
✓
↵2l2i
1
⌧h
(ei   e)2 + (1  ↵)2 (liei)2 1
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+ l2i
1
⌧✏
◆
.
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Figure 1: Noisy Industry Signal (⌧⇣) and Excessive E↵ort: The solid and the long-dashed lines represent
how the total performance sensitivity a, relative performance l, absolute performance m, and e↵ort (e)
change with respect to the noise of the average industry performance signal (⌧⇣) in equilibrium and in the
planner’s optimum, respectively. The parameters are fixed at r = 0.3, rP = 0.16, ⌧✏ = 1, h¯ = 0.6, and
⌧h = 0.05.
Taking the first-order condition and solving for ei, we obtain agent i’s e↵ort choice as
ei =
li
 
↵h¯+ (1  ↵) k + r⌧h↵2l2i e
1 +
⇣
↵2 r⌧h + (1  ↵)
2 r
⌧k
⌘
l2i
. (25)
As one would expect, e↵ort decreases with idiosyncratic volatility (1/⌧k), but as in the
main model, industry volatility (1/⌧h) has opposing e↵ects. In particular, as the projects
become more correlated agents have stronger incentive to match the average e↵ort e to
shield themselves from industry volatility. Conversely, when ↵ = 0, and the productivity
shock is only idiosyncratic, the feedback loop between the industry average e↵ort and an
individual agent’s e↵ort disappears. Therefore, earlier results on excessive (insu cient) e↵ort
provision arise when the productivity shocks are correlated across projects and become more
pronounced as ↵ increases and the correlated component dominates across projects in the
industry. Since industries di↵er in terms of correlations, intermediate cases where ↵ 2 (0, 1)
are important for taking the model to data.
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7.2 Intermediate Cases of Information Friction
In sections 5 and 6, we derive closed-form solutions and explore the properties of the
model with either no information frictions or with severe information frictions when only
RPE is informative. These cases correspond to ⌧⇣ equal to infinity or zero. In this section,
we look at the intermediate cases where 0 < ⌧⇣ <1, that is, principals receive an informative
but imperfect signal about absolute performances.
In these cases, the information friction does not eliminate, but nevertheless restricts prin-
cipals’ ability to use APE in contracts, causing externalities to prevail. Since a closed form
solution is not possible, we provide two numerical examples, showing how the equilibrium
and the second best incentives change with information friction, measured by the inverse of
⌧⇣ . One example is a case when contractual externalities cause excessive e↵ort/risk taking
relative to the second best; and the other is the opposite. In both examples, when ⌧⇣ in-
creases, the impact of the endogenous contractual externality becomes smaller as principals’
ability to span the risk space of the agents strengthens. Therefore, our numerical analysis
indicates that when the noise ⇣˜ becomes more precise, the impact of the externality weakens
and the gap between the equilibrium and the second best narrows.
The graphs in Figure 1 illustrate the intuition in the case where equilibrium e↵ort level
exceeds the second best. In this case, (22) is positive indicating that, without information
friction, principals would like to use positive APE (m⇤ > 0). As this noise becomes smaller
(ie., ⌧⇣ gets larger), the information friction on using APE is less constraining, principals
increase the equilibrium sensitivity to APE (m⇤) to give agents a positive exposure to the
industry risk and better control agents’ excessive correlated risk-taking. This is shown in
Figure 1(d). Correspondingly, this switch to the usage of APE in contracts leads to the
sensitivity to relative performance (l⇤) to drop in equilibrium, as shown in Figure 1(c).
However, the total performance sensitivity in the equilibrium contract (a⇤ = l⇤+m⇤) increases
since principals are able to use both contractual instruments, APE and RPE, more e↵ectively
as ⌧⇣ increases. Interestingly, agents reduce e↵ort in equilibrium because they are now
exposed to the industry risk through absolute performance pay, as shown in Figure 1(b).
Further, as expected, when ⌧⇣ gets larger, the information friction gets smaller, the impact
of the externality weakens, the gap between the equilibrium and the second best narrows.
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Figure 2: Noisy Industry Signal (⌧⇣) and Insu cient E↵ort: The solid and the long-dashed lines represent
how the total performance sensitivity l, relative performance l, absolute performancem, and e↵ort (e) change
with respect to the noise of the average industry performance signal (⌧⇣) in equilibrium and in the planner’s
optimum, respectively. The parameters are fixed at r = 0.3, rP = 0.01, ⌧✏ = 1, h¯ = 0.6, and ⌧h = 0.05.
The graphs in Figure 2 illustrate the intuition in the case where equilibrium e↵ort level falls
below the second best. In this case, (22) is negative indicating that, without information
friction, principals would like to use negative APE (m⇤ < 0). This happens when principals
are less risk-averse and/or idiosyncratic risks are relatively larger than the industry risks. In
these occasions, principals would not mind taking over a large portion of idiosyncratic risks
from their agents to lower contracting costs, which implies negative absolute performance
pay sensitivity. The noise in the industry output signal, ⇣˜, constrains principals’ ability to
do so. When ⌧⇣ gets larger, this constraint gets less binding, which explains the increased use
of APE (that is, the contract is more negatively related to absolute performance) in Figure
2(d). This in turns makes it less costly for principals to use RPE since agents bear less firm-
specific risks, resulting in higher usage of relative performance pay as in Figure 2(c). The
total performance sensitivity in the equilibrium contract (a⇤), just as in the previous case,
also increases in ⌧⇣ . Again when the noise in absolute performance signals becomes smaller,
principals are less constrained to use both contractual instruments, APE and RPE, to span
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the risk space agents are facing, as shown in Figure 2(a). Interestingly, agents increase
their e↵ort in equilibrium because they are less exposed to the idiosyncratic risk through
the lowered absolute performance sensitivity and more incentivised to take on correlated
industry risk through increased relative performance sensitivity, which is shown in Figure
2(b). Further, as expected, when ⌧⇣ gets larger, the information friction gets smaller, the
impact of the externality weakens, the gap between the equilibrium and the second best
narrows. These numerical examples show that the insights of the models are robust and
endogenous contractual externalities exist when there exists some form of the information
friction in the contracting environment.
7.3 Heterogeneity in Firm Sizes
In many industries the distribution of firm sizes is heterogeneous. Hence, incorporat-
ing heterogeneity into our main model can bring further realism and empirical relevance.
In Appendix B, we consider a variation of the original setup with one large and a contin-
uum of fringe firms. We show that the insights on contractual externalities are robust but
heterogeneity in firm sizes introduces additional e↵ects.
In this extension the outcome of a specific firm’s project has a large impact on the
industry benchmark. We call this firm the large firm. In addition, we allow the large firm to
face a di↵erent level of idiosyncratic noise in its project and its principal and agent to have
di↵erent risk aversion parameters from the fringe firms. Contract terms are the same as in
the original setup, ie, contracts are based on each firm’s own signal as well as the industry
benchmark. For the fringe firms, our previous results on contractual externalities obtain
because the fringe firms do not internalise their impact on the industry benchmark (but now
the large firm has a non-negligible weight on the benchmark). Interestingly, there are some
new e↵ects. First, the fringe firms do not internalise the impact of their contractual choices on
the large firm. This might lead the fringe to push the large firm into suboptimal investment
and risk-taking. Second, we find a new feedback loop that introduces an additional source
for contractual externalities. Although the large firm filters out its agent’s e↵ort from the
industry average when solving its problem, its agent’s e↵ort a↵ects the e↵orts of the fringe
firms’ agents (through its impact on the industry average), which in turn a↵ects the e↵ort
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of its own agent. Finally, the existence of a large non-negligible firm presents interesting
contracting issues for small firms. Since small firms use only the industry average and their
own firm’s payo↵ signal in their compensation contracts, they are unable to filter out the
idiosyncratic noise in the large firm’s project. As a result, the idiosyncratic noise in the large
firm’s project a↵ects the contracting problem of the fringe firms and their agents’ e↵ort
decisions, hence the endogenous industry-wide volatility. In this case, externalities will have
welfare impact even when the industry-wide signal noise is absent. This problem will be
dampened if the fringe firms include systemically important firms’ payo↵ signals in their
contracts. This is potentially interesting to examine empirically in future work.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we study how information frictions in contracting leads to pro-cyclical
and potentially excessive risk-taking in the economy. In our model, principals set contracts
to make individually optimal risk-return trade-o↵s ignoring their impact on contracting
benchmarks such as average e↵ort in the industry. This results in contractual externalities.
In our baseline model, absolute performance signals do not have any correlated noise and
contracts are based on both APE and RPE. We show that by shielding agents from it,
RPE encourages agents to take industry risk which the principals must shoulder. Despite
this, principals use the two contractual instruments to tailor their agents’ exposures to the
industry and idiosyncratic risks and eliminate the welfare impact of contractual externalities.
However, in presence of information frictions contractual externalities have welfare chang-
ing e↵ects. For example, when there is a high level of uncertainty about industry produc-
tivity, relative performance information is likely to be more precise and principals put more
weight on RPE in contracting. Over-reliance on RPE may set o↵ the ratchet e↵ect in e↵ort
choices among agents. For example, risk-averse principals are eager to provide more powerful
incentives during booms, causing the industry average e↵ort to be high, triggering a rat race
among agents to exert excessive e↵ort, which results in excessive systemic risk exposure in
the economy, relative to the second-best. During recessions, the opposite might happen: The
incentive provision is too weak and the equilibrium level of e↵ort is lower than the second
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best.
Besides theoretical contributions, our results o↵er a novel explanation, based on frictions
in managerial compensation, to the boom-bust cycle of investment and risk-taking observed
in industries that experience new but uncertain productivity shocks. These episodes are
abundant in recent years. For example, following the introduction of the Internet, the
dot.com industry has been flooded with investment which is subsequently reduced. Simi-
larly, following the innovations in the financial products such as asset-based securities, the
financial industry has expanded significantly followed by a sharp contraction. Compensa-
tion regulations such as enforcing counter-cyclical performance pay could improve the total
welfare.
More broadly, the baseline model in the paper o↵ers a equilibrium framework of decen-
tralised contract choices of individual firms, setting an incentive foundation for studying
macro-firm dynamics. There are potentially a host of interesting extensions that incorporate
various types of market structures and frictions. These possible extensions can introduce
additional realism to our analysis and, more importantly, generate new insights about the
inter-firm dynamics and implications for macro aggregates. For example, given that the
uncertainty is modelled as normal distribution, the baseline model is well suited to study
asset pricing implications for aggregate (and endogenous) market risks when combined with
an equity market. The model can also be extended to study how the industry structure ef-
fects the contractual arrangements with a small number of large firms, and how idiosyncratic
noises of the large firms may potentially a↵ect small firms’ investment decisions and hence
become non-diversifiable industry risks.
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Appendix A
Proofs
In the proofs we drop the subscript i when there is no room for confusion.
Proof of Proposition 1
Note that
ei =
(li +mi) h¯+
r
⌧h
li (li +mi) e¯
1 + r⌧h (li +mi)
2 = (li +mi) h¯+ o (1/⌧h) .
Let ai = li +mi. Substituting this into (11) we obtain:
max
ai,bi
ai
 
h¯
 2    aih¯ 2
2
  1
2
✓
a2i
r
⌧✏
+m2i
r
⌧⇣
◆
  1
2
✓
(1  ai)2 rP
⌧✏
+m2i
rP
⌧⇣
◆
+ o (1/⌧h) W.
For su ciently large ⌧h this function is concave in (ai,mi) and has a unique maximum
(a⇤,m⇤) which is identical for all principals. From this we solve for the unique l⇤ = a⇤ m⇤.
Proof of Proposition 2:
Let a = l +m. The principals’ objective can be rewritten as
h¯e  1
2
e2   1
2
✓
(ae  le¯)2 r
⌧h
+ a2
r
⌧✏
◆
  1
2
✓
((1  a) e+ le¯)2 rP
⌧h
+ (1  a)2 rP
⌧✏
◆
, (A1)
and the optimal level of e↵ort as a function of contract terms and the average e↵ort can be
rewritten as
e =
ah¯+ r⌧h lae¯
1 + r⌧ha
2
.
Next substituting for the e↵ort level in the objective function of (A1) we obtain0@h¯ ah¯+ r⌧h lae¯
1 + r⌧ha
2
!
  1
2
 
ah¯+ r⌧h lae¯
1 + r⌧ha
2
!2
  1
2
0@ a ah¯+ r⌧h lae¯
1 + r⌧ha
2
!
  le¯
!2
r
⌧h
+ a2
r
⌧✏
1A1A
 1
2
0@ (1  a) ah¯+ r⌧h lae¯
1 + r⌧ha
2
!
+ le¯
!2
rP
⌧h
+ (1  a)2 rP
⌧✏
1A . (A2)
For a given a the above function is negative quadratic in l. Thus for a given a principals’
objective function is maximised at l (a) which is given by
l (a) =
h¯a
⇣
r
⌧h
⇣
r
⌧h
a2 + 1
⌘
  rP⌧h (1  a)
⇣
r
⌧h
a+ 1
⌘⌘
e¯
✓
r
⌧h
⇣
r
⌧h
a2 + 1
⌘
+ rP⌧h
⇣
r
⌧h
a+ 1
⌘2◆ . (A3)
40
Substituting (A3) for l (a) in (A2) we reduce principals’ problem to choosing a to maximize
1
2
h¯2a
✓
r
⌧h
+
rP
⌧h
◆ a⇣ r⌧h   1⌘+ 2
r
⌧h
+ rP⌧h +
⇣
r
⌧h
⌘2
a2 + rP⌧h
⇣
r
⌧h
⌘2
a2 + 2 rP⌧h
r
⌧h
a
  1
2
a2
r
⌧✏
  1
2
(1  a)2 rP
⌧✏
.
Taking the derivative with respect to a, we obtain
 h¯2
⇣
r
⌧h
a+ 1
⌘⇣
r
⌧h
+ rP⌧h
⌘2
(a  1)✓
r
⌧h
+ rP⌧h +
⇣
r
⌧h
⌘2
a2 + rP⌧h
⇣
r
⌧h
⌘2
a2 + 2 rP⌧h
r
⌧h
a
◆2   a r⌧✏   (a  1) rP⌧✏ .
Note that the above function starts as positive and crosses to negative once. Thus the
objective function is maximised at a⇤ that solves
H (a) =   h¯2
✓
r
⌧h
a+ 1
◆✓
r
⌧h
+
rP
⌧h
◆2
(a  1)
 
 
r
⌧h
+
rP
⌧h
+
✓
r
⌧h
◆2
a2
✓
rP
⌧h
+ 1
◆
+ 2
rP
⌧h
r
⌧h
a
!2✓
a
r
⌧✏
+ (a  1) rP
⌧✏
◆
= 0.
Note that a⇤ 2 (0, 1). In equilibrium
e¯ =
a⇤h¯+ r⌧ha
⇤l (a⇤) e¯
1 + r⌧h (a
⇤)2
.
Plugging for l (a⇤), we obtain
e¯ =
h¯a⇤
⇣
r
⌧h
a⇤ + 1
⌘⇣
r
⌧h
+ rP⌧h
⌘
r
⌧h
⇣
r
⌧h
(a⇤)2 + 1
⌘
+ rP⌧h
⇣
r
⌧h
a⇤ + 1
⌘2 .
Using the above to substitute for e¯ in (A3), we obtain
l (a⇤) =
r
⌧h
⇣
1 + r⌧h (a
⇤)2
⌘
+ rP⌧h (a
⇤   1)
⇣
r
⌧h
a⇤ + 1
⌘
⇣
r
⌧h
a⇤ + 1
⌘⇣
r
⌧h
+ rP⌧h
⌘ . (A4)
Thus
m⇤ = a⇤   l (a⇤) = a⇤i  
r
⌧h
⇣
1 + r⌧h (a
⇤
i )
2
⌘
+ rP⌧h (a
⇤
i   1)
⇣
r
⌧h
a⇤i + 1
⌘
⇣
r
⌧h
a⇤i + 1
⌘⇣
r
⌧h
+ rP⌧h
⌘ .
Proof of Corollary 1:
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We continue to use the notation in the proof of Proposition 2. Using (A4),
m⇤ = a⇤ l (a⇤) > 0, l (a⇤) < a⇤ , rP
⌧h
✓
1 +
r
⌧h
a⇤
◆
>
r
⌧h
(1  a⇤), a⇤ >
0@ r⌧h   rP⌧h
r
⌧h
⇣
1 + rP⌧h
⌘
1A .
Note
H
0@ r⌧h   rP⌧h
r
⌧h
⇣
1 + rP⌧h
⌘
1A =
1
r
⌧h
1⇣
rP
⌧h
+ 1
⌘3 ✓ r⌧h + rP⌧h
◆2✓ r
⌧h
+ 1
◆2 rP
⌧h
r
⌧✏
  r
⌧h
r
⌧✏
+ h¯2
✓
rP
⌧h
◆2
+ h¯2
rP
⌧h
+
rP
⌧h
rP
⌧✏
+
rP
⌧h
rP
⌧✏
r
⌧h
!
.
Thus l (a⇤)  a⇤ if and only if✓
h¯2
rP
⌧h
✓
rP
⌧h
+ 1
◆
+
rP
⌧✏
rP
⌧h
✓
r
⌧h
+ 1
◆◆
  r
⌧✏
✓
r
⌧h
  rP
⌧h
◆
which is equivalent to (16).
Proof of Proposition 3
Proof is given in the text following the statement of Proposition 3.
Proof of Proposition 4
From Proposition 1, we know the existence part holds.
We use (9) to plug in for e in the principals’ problem (11) (where m is set to zero given
that the signal si is uninformative) and take the derivative of the objective function with
respect to l to find the first-order condition as a function of e¯.
In equilibrium, e¯ = lh¯. Therefore any equilibrium must solve for the first-order condition
and e¯ = lh¯. To find an equilibrium we plug e¯ = lh¯ in the first order condition. After
simplifying we find the equilibrium condition:
h¯2
(l   1)
⇣
l rP⌧h   1
⌘
r
⌧h
l2 + 1
 
✓
r
⌧✏
l   rP
⌧✏
(1  l)
◆
= 0.
The next lemma is useful in proving the comparative statics results:
42
Lemma 1 Let
 (l) = h¯2
(l   1)
⇣
l rP⌧h   1
⌘
r
⌧h
l2 + 1
. (A5)
Suppose there is a unique equilibrium, then the following are true. (i)  (l) 
⇣
r
⌧✏
l   rP⌧✏ (1  l)
⌘
crosses zero from above at l⇤ 2 (0, 1) where  is given in (A5). (ii) If ⌧h/rP > rP/(r + rP )
then l⇤ < ⌧hrP , otherwise l
⇤ > ⌧hrP .
Proof of Lemma 1
Part (i) follows from  (0) + rP⌧✏ > 0,  (1)  r⌧✏ < 0 and uniqueness. The proof of (ii) is
immediate if ⌧hrP > 1. So suppose
⌧h
rP
< 1. Note  (l)  
⇣
r
⌧✏
l   rP⌧✏ (1  l)
⌘
is above  (l) for
l < rP/(r + rP ) and is below  (l) for l > rP/(r + rP ). This and the fact that there is a
unique equilibrium l⇤ prove part (ii).
Proof of Proposition 5
Equilibrium l⇤ solves
 (l⇤) 
✓
r
⌧✏
l⇤   rP
⌧✏
(1  l⇤)
◆
= 0
where  is given in (A5). We write  
 
l⇤
 
h¯
 
, h¯
 
to make the dependence of  and l⇤ on h¯
explicit. We use similar notation for other parameters, eg,  (l⇤ (⌧h) , ⌧h).
Taking the total derivative of the equilibrium condition with respect to h¯ we obtain
@l⇤
 
h¯
 
@h¯
=
 @ 
@h¯
@ (l⇤(h¯),h¯)
@l  
⇣
r
⌧✏
+ rP⌧✏
⌘ .
Denominator is negative by Lemma 1 (i). By Lemma 1 (ii),
@ 
 
l⇤, h¯
 
@h¯
=  2h¯
(1  l⇤)
⇣
rP
⌧h
l⇤   1
⌘
r
⌧h
(l⇤)2 + 1
? 0
if ⌧hrP ?
rP
⌧✏
/
⇣
r
⌧✏
+ rP⌧✏
⌘
which proves part (i) for h¯. Proof for the result on ⌧✏ is entirely
analogous.
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Proof of Proposition 6
To prove the first statement, we take the total derivative of the equilibrium condition
with respect to rP to obtain
@l⇤
@rP
=  
@ 
@rP
+ 1⌧✏ (1  l⇤)
@ 
@l  
⇣
r
⌧✏
+ rP⌧✏
⌘
Denominator is negative by Lemma 1 (i). Moreover,
@ 
@rP
+
1
⌧✏
(1  l⇤) = h¯2
(l   1)
⇣
l
⌧h
⌘
r
⌧h
l2 + 1
+
1
⌧✏
(1  l⇤)
Hence @l
⇤
@rP
< 0 if
h¯2⌧✏ >
✓
r
⌧h
(l⇤)2 + 1
◆
⌧h
l⇤
(A6)
On the right hand side of (A6) only l⇤ depends on h¯ or ⌧✏. We know that l⇤ takes a value
between rPr+rP and
⌧h
rP
. Hence the r.h.s. is bounded in h¯ and ⌧✏. As a result (A6) holds if h¯ or
⌧✏ are large.
To prove the second statement, we take the total derivative of the equilibrium condition
with respect to r to obtain:
@l⇤ (r)
@r
=
 @ @r + 1⌧✏ l⇤
@ 
@l  
⇣
r
⌧✏
+ rP⌧✏
⌘ .
Denominator is negative by Lemma 1 (i). Thus @l
⇤(r)
@r > 0 i↵
@ (l⇤, r)
@r
  1
⌧✏
l⇤ = h¯2
(1  l⇤)
⇣
rP
⌧h
l⇤   1
⌘
⇣
r
⌧h
(l⇤)2 + 1
⌘2 (l⇤)2⌧h   1⌧✏ l⇤ > 0.
From Lemma 1 (ii), ⌧hrP <
rP
⌧✏
/
⇣
r
⌧✏
+ rP⌧✏
⌘
implies l⇤ > ⌧hrP . Hence, the above inequality holds
if and only if
h¯2⌧✏ >
⇣
r
⌧h
(l⇤)2 + 1
⌘2
⌧h
(1  l⇤)
⇣
rP
⌧h
l⇤   1
⌘
l⇤
. (A7)
On the right hand side of (A7) only l⇤ depends on h¯ or ⌧✏ and ⌧hrP  l⇤  rPr+rP . Hence the
right hand side is bounded in h¯ and ⌧✏. As a result (A7) holds if h¯ or ⌧✏ are large.
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Proof of Proposition 7
Proof follows from plugging lSB in the equilibrium condition (17) and checking whether
its value is positive (in which case lSB < l⇤) or negative (in which case lSB > l⇤).
Appendix B
One Large and a Continuum of Fringe Firms
This section contains a variation of the main model with one large and a continuum of
fringe firms. We use the subscript L for variables relating to the large firm. The value of the
large firm’s project is VL = h˜eL + ⇣˜ and signal is sL = h˜eL + ✏˜L + ⇣˜ where eL is the e↵ort
choice of the large firm’s agent, ✏˜L is normal with mean zero and precision ⌧L. We index the
fringe firms by i 2 [0, 1] . We define the value of fringe firm i’s project Vi and its signal si
exactly as in the main model. We denote the risk aversion parameters of the large firm’s
agent and principal by rL and rLP respectively. The remaining parameters (⌧h, ⌧✏, ⌧⇣ , r, rP )
are also defined as in the main model. Hence, we allow the large firm to be di↵erent from
the fringe firms both in terms of the variance in its idiosyncratic noise and its risk aversion
parameters.
We define the industry average signal as:
sI = ⇢sL + (1  ⇢)
Z
i2[0,1]
sidi = h˜ (⇢eL + (1  ⇢) eF ) + ⇢✏˜L + ⇣˜
where eF denotes the average e↵ort of the agents who work for the fringe firms and ⇢ 2 [0, 1]
is the impact of the large firm on the industry average signal. The parameter ⇢ captures the
size of the large firm relative to the fringe.
We define the signal about the agent’s performance relative to industry average as qL =
(sL sI)/ (1  ⇢) for the large firm and qi = si sI for fringe firm i. Thus, qL = h˜ (eL   eF )+✏˜L
and qi = h˜ (ei   e) + ✏˜i   ⇢✏˜L where e = ⇢eL + (1  ⇢) eF . When using RPE the large firm’s
principal compares the performance of its agent with only the average performance of the
fringe firms’ agents since it filters out its own performance from the average. In contrast,
since the fringe firms are atomistic and ignore their impact on the average, they compare the
performance of their agents both with the large firm’s agent and the average performance of
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other fringe firms’ agents. In addition, the RPE signal for the fringe firms is a↵ected by the
large firm’s idiosyncratic noise.
The large firm uses a linear contract in the form lLqL +mLsL +WL and the fringe firm
i uses a contract in the form liqi +misi +Wi. Given the contract (li,mi,Wi) and average
e↵ort e = ⇢eL + (1  ⇢) eF agent i ’s optimal e↵ort choice ei is given by:
ei =
(li +mi) h¯+
r
⌧h
li (li +mi) e¯
1 + r⌧h (li +mi)
2 . (B1)
Similarly, given the contract (lL,mL,WL) and eF agent L’s optimal e↵ort choice eL is given
by:
eL =
(lL +mL) h¯+
rL
⌧h
lL (lL +mL) e¯F
1 + r
L
⌧h
(lL +mL)
2 . (B2)
Finally, given e = ⇢eL + (1  ⇢) eF principal i chooses (li,mi) to maximize:
h¯ei   C (ei)  1
2
rP
✓
(ei   li (ei   e) miei)2 1
⌧h
+ (1  li  mi)2 1
⌧✏
+ ⇢2l2i
1
⌧L
+m2i
1
⌧⇣
◆
 1
2
r
✓
(li (ei   e¯) +miei)2 1
⌧h
+ (li +mi)
2 1
⌧✏
+ ⇢2l2i
1
⌧L
+m2i
1
⌧⇣
◆
  I¯ (B3)
subject to (B1) and, given eF principal L chooses (lL,mL) to maximize:
h¯eL   C (eL)  1
2
rLP
✓
(eL   lL (eL   eF ) mLeL)2 1
⌧h
+ (1  lL  mL)2 1
⌧L
+m2L
1
⌧⇣
◆
 1
2
rL
✓
(lL (ei   e¯F ) +mLeL)2 1
⌧h
+ (lL +mL)
2 1
⌧L
+m2L
1
⌧⇣
◆
  I¯ (B4)
subject to (B2).
From this analysis we make the following observations.
First, comparing (B3) with the principals’ problem (11) in our main model, we see that
the two are similar except that the fringe firms’ agents have an incentive to match e =
⇢eL + (1  ⇢) eF which is influenced by the large firm’s agent’s e↵ort. In addition, the
large firm’s idiosyncratic risk enters fringe firms’ problems through the term ⇢2l2i (1/⌧L). In
contrast, we see from (B4) that the large firm’s agent has an incentive to match the fringe
firms’ agents’ average e↵ort e¯F .
Second, the fringe firms do not internalise the impact of their contractual choices on the
large firm. This might lead the fringe to push the large firm into suboptimal investment and
risk-taking.
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Third, although the large firm filters out its own agent’s e↵ort from the industry average
when it is solving its own problem, its agent’s e↵ort indirectly a↵ects the e↵orts of the fringe
firms’ agents (due to its impact on e) and through this channel a↵ects the e↵ort of its own
agent. This creates a feedback loop that introduces an additional source for contractual
externalities. If the large firm provides stronger incentives to its agent, than this increases
the e↵orts of the fringe firms’ agents. Since the large firm’s agent has an incentive to match
eF , this leads to an increase in the large firm’s agent’s e↵ort.
Fourth, we see from (B3) that the idiosyncratic noise of the large firm enters the fringe
firms’ contracting problem playing a role similar to the industry-wide signal noise a↵ecting
optimal choice of contracts and e↵ort. In this case, externalities will have welfare impact
even when the industry-wide signal noise is absent (ie, when ⌧⇣ =1.)
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